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Trademark infringement only if the
mark used in an expressive work has:
” to the
(1) “no
underlying work and
(2) if there is artistic relevance, use of
the mark in the accused work
“
as to the source
or the content of the work.”

Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875
F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
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Twentieth Century Fox
Television v. Empire
Distribution Inc., 875
F.3d 1192 (9th Cir.
2017)
There was no infringement of the mark
EMPIRE used by plaintiff for hip hop,
rap, and R&B music publishing by use
in advertising and promotion for Fox's
EMPIRE television series that portrays
a fictional hip hop music label named
“Empire Enterprises.”

EXPEDITE DISMISSAL

BURDEN OF PROOF
NINTH CIRCUIT: IF IT’S FREE

Rule 12(b)(6)
Dismissal
Failure to State a
Claim
Summary
Dismissal

SPEECH, IT’S PLAINTIFF'S
BURDEN TO OVERCOME THE
ROGERS HURDLE. Gordon v

Drape, 909 F.3d 257, 264 (9th Cir.
2018)

Plaintiff

Rogers
Hurdle

LOC

AMOUNT OF ARTISTIC
RELEVANCE OF THE MARK TO THE
ACCUSED WORK IS SUFFICIENT
“[T]he level of relevance merely must be

.”

E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc.
v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100, (9th
Cir. 2008)

“This black-and-white rule has the benefit of limiting
our need to engage in artistic analysis in this
context.” Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1243,
(9th Cir. 2013)

A video game in which the player is in New York City, fighting to save the
world from a rampaging robot monster who is destroying everything in its
path. In one scene set in Times Square, the monster is ripping up the place
and tears to pieces a big McDonald’s golden arches sign.

VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer
Entertainment America LLC, 2015 WL
5000102, *11 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff'd, 699
Fed. Appx. 667 (9th Cir. 2017)
VIDEO GAME

REALITY

: “Sony's use of the VIRAG
trademark furthers its goal of realism, a
legitimate artistic goal, …. and therefore
satisfies the requirement that Sony's use
of the trademark have ‘above zero’ artistic
relevance to the Gran Turismo games.”)

Stage play parody of Dr. Seuss book “How The Grinch Stole Christmas”
was not trademark infringement, citing the Rogers precedent. It also
was not copyright infringement.

versus

“I hold that the public interest in free
expression clearly outweighs any
interest in avoiding consumer
confusion, the likelihood of which is
extremely minimal given the parodic
nature of the Play.” Lombardo v. Dr.
Seuss Enterprises, L.P., 279 F. Supp.
3d 497, 514 (S.D. N.Y. 2017), aff'd,
729 Fed. Appx. 131 (2d Cir. 2018)

DIRECT REFERENCE TO PLAINTIFF AND CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE MARK: “[P]laintiff's mark must be of such cultural significance
that it has become an integral part of the public's vocabulary … .
[Rogers] requires the artistic relevance of defendant's use to be with
reference to the meaning associated with plaintiff's mark.”
Rebelution, LLC v. Perez, 732 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887–888 (N.D. Cal. 2010)

Twentieth Century Fox Television v.
Empire Distribution, Inc., , 161 F.Supp. 3d 902, 906
(C.D.. Cal. 2016) affirmed 875 F.3d 1192, 1199 (9th Cir.
2017)

: “explicitly misleads”
means that confusion must be
“particularly compelling,” This seems to
be an more exacting version of
likelihood of confusion.
: The “explicitly misleads”
test is not the same as the “likelihood of
confusion” standard. “Explicitly” means there
should be “overt claims” or “explicit
references” to the senior user. Empire
decision.

Rogers v. Grimaldi






“Titles, like the artistic works they identify, are of a hybrid nature,
combining artistic expression and commercial promotion. The title of a
movie may be both an integral element of the film-maker's expression as
well as a significant means of marketing the film to the public. The artistic
and commercial elements of titles are inextricably intertwined.”
“Consumers of artistic works thus have a dual interest: They have an
interest in not being misled and they also have an interest in enjoying the
results of the author's freedom of expression. For all these reasons, the
expressive element of titles requires more protection than the labeling of
ordinary commercial products.”
“In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity's name, that
balance will normally not support application of the Act [1] unless the title
has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, [2] if it has
some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or
the content of the work.”

Univ. of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art

Twentieth Century Fox v. Empire

Twentieth Century Fox v. Empire
In 2015, Fox premiered a television show titled Empire, which
portrays a fictional hip hop music label named “Empire Enterprises”
that is based in New York. The show features songs in every
episode, including some original music. Under an agreement with
Fox, Columbia Records releases music from the show after each
episode airs, as well as soundtrack albums at the end of each season.
Fox has also promoted the Empire show and its associated music
through live musical performances, radio play, and consumer goods
such as shirts and champagne glasses bearing the show's “Empire”
brand.

Gordon v. Drape

{

Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox

• “[T]he gravamen of [Fox’s] claim is that, in marketing and selling Campaigns
as its own product without acknowledging its nearly wholesale reliance on
the Crusade television series, Dastar has made a ‘false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation
of fact, which ... is likely to cause confusion ... as to the origin ... of his or her
goods.’”

Dastar
We think the most natural understanding of the “origin” of “goods”—the
source of wares—is the producer of the tangible product sold in the
marketplace, in this case the physical Campaigns videotape sold by
Dastar. The concept might be stretched (as it was under the original
version of § 43(a)) to include not only the actual producer, but also the
trademark owner who commissioned or assumed responsibility for
(“stood behind”) production of the physical product. But as used in the
Lanham Act, the phrase “origin of goods” is in our view incapable of
connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or
communications that “goods” embody or contain.

Dastar
It could be argued, perhaps, that the reality of purchaser concern is different for what
might be called a communicative product—one that is valued not primarily for its
physical qualities, such as a hammer, but for the intellectual content that it conveys, such
as a book or, as here, a video …. For such a communicative product (the argument goes)
“origin of goods” in § 43(a) must be deemed to include not merely the producer of the
physical item (the publishing house Farrar, Straus and Giroux, or the video producer
Dastar) but also the creator of the content that the physical item conveys (the author Tom
Wolfe, or—assertedly—respondents).
The problem with this argument according special treatment to communicative products
is that it causes the Lanham Act to conflict with the law of copyright, which addresses
that subject specifically.
In sum, reading the phrase “origin of goods” in the Lanham Act in accordance with the
Act's common-law foundations (which were not designed to protect originality or
creativity), and in light of the copyright and patent laws (which were ), we conclude that
the phrase refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to
the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.

Rogers and Dastar
• Rogers cases involve claims that use of a mark in the title
or the content of a work falsely suggests that the mark
owner is the source of the work, or has sponsored or
endorsed the work.
• Dastar tells us that only claims regarding the source of
tangible goods are cognizable under the Lanham Act.
• Nearly all claims that now fail under Rogers are actually
barred by Dastar anyway
• Empire?
• Gordon v. Drape?

Rogers and Dastar
• Rogers cases involve claims that use of a mark in the title or the
content of a work falsely suggests that the mark owner is the source
of the work, or has sponsored or endorsed the work.
• Dastar tells us that only claims regarding the source of tangible
goods are cognizable under the Lanham Act.
• Nearly all claims that now fail under Rogers are actually barred by
Dastar anyway
• Empire?
• Gordon v. Drape?
• In fact, some claims left open by Rogers are barred by Dastar

Rogers v. Grimaldi:
“Poetic license is not without limits. The purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a can
of peas, has a right not to be misled as to the source of the product. Thus, it is well
established that where the title of a movie or a book has acquired secondary meaning—
that is, where the title is sufficiently well known that consumers associate it with a
particular author's work—the holder of the rights to that title may prevent the use of the
same or confusingly similar titles by other authors.”
Dastar:
We think the most natural understanding of the “origin” of “goods”—the source of
wares—is the producer of the tangible product sold in the marketplace, in this case the
physical Campaigns videotape sold by Dastar. The concept might be stretched (as it
was under the original version of § 43(a)) to include not only the actual producer, but
also the trademark owner who commissioned or assumed responsibility for (“stood
behind”) production of the physical product. But as used in the Lanham Act, the phrase
“origin of goods” is in our view incapable of connoting the person or entity that
originated the ideas or communications that “goods” embody or contain.

Rogers v. Grimaldi:
“Similarly, titles with at least minimal artistic relevance to the work may include explicit
statements about the content of the work that are seriously misleading. For example, if the
characters in the film in this case had published their memoirs under the title 'True Life Story
of Ginger and Fred,’ and if the film-maker had then used that fictitious book title as the title
of the film, the Lanham Act could be applicable to such an explicitly misleading description
of content….Where a title with at least some artistic relevance to the work is not explicitly
misleading as to the content of the work, it is not false advertising under the Lanham Act.”
Dastar:
If, moreover, the producer of a video that substantially copied the Crusade series were, in
advertising or promotion, to give purchasers the impression that the video was quite
different from that series, then one or more of the respondents might have a cause of
action—not for reverse passing off under the “confusion ... as to the origin” provision of §
43(a)(1)(A), but for misrepresentation under the “misrepresents the nature, characteristics
[or] qualities” provision of § 43(a)(1)(B). For merely saying it is the producer of the video,
however, no Lanham Act liability attaches to Dastar.

CAN / SHOULD

(1) Is the trademark owner an
advertiser, potential advertiser, or
competitor?
(2) Does use of the trademark
replace, dilute, or conflict with paid
placement opportunity?

Placeholder for Adam Ruins Everything and ATHF clips

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlBdUr8atKY

What is “artistic relevance” in a virtual world?

Tarnishment in a Virtual Reality World

